Security

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
Security and Information Leakage

- Hardware isolation mechanisms like virtual memory guarantee that architectural state will not be directly exposed to other processes...but
- ISA is a timing-independent interface, and
 - Specify what should happen, not when
- ISA only specifies architectural updates (reg, mem, PC...)
 - Micro-architectural changes are left unspecified
- So implementation details and timing behaviors (e.g., microarchitectural state, power, etc.) have been exploited to breach security mechanisms.
- In specific, they have been used as channels to leak information!

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
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Standard Communication Model



- 1. Transmitter gets a message
- 2. Transmitter modulates channel
- 3. Receiver detects modulation on channel
- 4. Receiver decodes modulation as message


Communication Model of Attacks [Belay, Devadas, Emer]



- Domains Distinct architectural domains in which architectural state is not shared.
- Secret the "message" that is transmitted on the channel and detected by the receiver
- Channel some "state" that can be changed, i.e., modulated, by the "transmitter" and whose modulation can be detected by the "receiver".


Because channel is not a "direct" communication channel, it is often referred to as a "side channel"

Communication Model of Attacks [Belay, Devadas, Emer]



- 1. Transmitter "accesses" secret
- 2. Transmitter modulates channel *(microarchitectural state)* with a message based on secret
- 3. Receiver detects modulation on channel
- 4. Receiver decodes modulation as a message containing the secret

ATM Acoustic Channels








• Secret:

- Transmitter:
- Channel:
- Modulation:
- Receiver:
- Decoders:

Physical vs Timing vs uArch Channel

• Types of channels



Attacker requires measurement equipment → physical access Attacker may be remote (e.g., over an internet connection)

Timing Channel Example


```
def check(input):
    size = len(passwd); //passwd contains 8 digits
    for i in range(0,size):
        if (input [i] != password[i]):
            return ("error");
    return ("success")
```

Blind guess needs to maximally try: 10^8 Can we do better to reduce the number of trials?

Physical vs Timing vs uArch Channel

Timing channels

• Types of channels




Attacker requires measurement equipment → physical access Attacker may be remote (e.g., over an internet connection)

Response

time

Processor

Victim




Attacker may be remote, or be colocated

Side Channel Attacks in 1977

- A side channel due to disk arm optimization
 - Enqueues requests by ascending cylinder number and dequeues (executes) them by the "elevator algorithm."
- Example:
 - 1. Receiver issues a request to 55
 - 2. Sender issues a request to either 53 or 57
 - 3. Receiver then issues requests to both 52 and 58
- Q: If the Receiver receives data for 52 first, can we guess what did Sender issue before?
- Q: If we remove step 1, can the attack still work?


Note this requires an "active" receiver that preconditions the channel








Communication w/ Active Receiver




- An active receiver may need to "precondition" the channel to prepare for detecting modulation
- An active receiver also needs to deal with synchronization of transmission (modulation) activity with reception (demodulation) activity.

A Cache-based Channel




A Cache-based Channel




Transmitter in RSA [Percival 2005]


• Square-and-multiply based exponentiation



A Multi-way Cache-based Channel




A Multi-way Cache-based Channel



122-16

Generalizes to Other Resources




Any other exploitable structures?

Channel Examples

Resource	Shared by
Private cache (L1, L2)	Intra-core
Shared cache (LLC)	On-socket cross core
Cache directory	Cross socket
DRAM row buffer	Cross socket
TLB (private/shared)	Intra-core/Inter-core
Branch Predictor	Intra-core
Network-on-chip	On-socket cross core


See Attack in Action: Flush+Reload

- The conceptual version
 - The sender and receiver shares addresses in a page
 - Sender repeated accesses address A or B
 - Receiver repeats:
 - flush A and B; using "clflush" -> precondition
 - wait for a few cycles; (sender does something) -> modulation
 - time how long it takes to reload A and B -> receive+decode



See Attack in Action: Page Sharing

- Virtual addresses in different processes map to the same physical address. When?
 - Lazy page allocation
 - Shared library
 - Memory de-duplication



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See Attack in Action: Pseudocode

Sender:


```
buffer = mmap(4KB);
secret = getinput();
while (true){
    load buffer[secret*64];
              Why *64?
```

Receiver:

```
buffer = mmap(4KB);
hit_count [MAX] = 0;
```

```
for i in range(0,MAX){
    t1 = rdtsc();
    load buffer[i*64];
    t2 = rdtsc();
    if (t2-t1 > threshold){
        hit_count[i] ++;
     }
}
```


Disrupting Communication



"We found that identifying all of the sources of accurate clocks was much **easier** than finding all of the possible timing channels in the system.


... If we could make the clocks less accurate, then the effective bandwidth of all timing channels in the system would be **lowered**." (1991)

Secret-independent Channel Modulation



- Different from conventional communication, this is a side channel (*unintended* communication).
- One mitigation is to not use the channel.
- -> "data-oblivious execution" or "constant-time programming".

Secret-independent Channel Modulation




How to make the code execution independent of the secret?

No secret-dependent branches, memory accesses, floating point operations


After removing the secret-dependent branch, how about code inside these functions?

Constant-time programming is hard


Disrupting Communication



Disrupting Communication




Disjoint Channels



- Making disjoint channels makes communication impossible.
- Channel can be allocated by "domain" and will need to be "cleaned" as processes enter and leave running state, so next process cannot see any "modulation" on the channel.

Types of Transmitters



- Types of transmitter:
 - Pre-existing so victim itself leaks secret, (e.g., RSA keys)
 Programmed and invoked by attacker (e.g., Meltdown)

Reminder: Speculative Execution



- In x86, a page table can have kernel pages which are only accessible in kernel mode:
 - This avoids switching page tables on context switches, but
 - Hardware speculatively assumes that there will not be an illegal access, so instructions following an illegal instruction are executed speculatively.
- So what does the following code do when run in user mode do?
 val = *kernel address;
- Causes a protection fault, but data at "kernel_address" is speculatively read and loaded into val.


Meltdown [Lipp et al. 2018]

- 1. Preconditioning: Receiver allocates an array subchannels[256] and flushes all its cache lines
- 2. Transmit: Transmitter (controlled by attacker) executes

uint8_t secret = *kernel_address; subchannels[secret] = 1;

- 3. Receive: After handling protection fault, receiver times accesses to all of subchannels[256], finds the subchannel that was "modulated" to decode the secret.
- Result: Attacker can read arbitrary kernel data!
 - For higher performance, use transactional memory (protection fault aborts transaction on exception instead of invoking kernel)
 - Mitigation?

Types of Transmitters



- Types of transmitter:
 - 1. Pre-existing so victim itself leaks secret, (e.g., RSA keys)
 - 2. Programmed and invoked by attacker (e.g., Meltdown)
 - 3. Synthesized from existing victim code and invoked by attacker (e.g., Spectre v2)

Spectre variant 1 [Kocher et al. 2018]

• Consider a situation where there is some kernel code that looks like the following:

xmit: uint8_t index = *kernel_address; uint8_t dummy = random_array[index];

• Interpret that code as a transmitter:

xmit: uint8_t secret = *kernel_address; uint8_t dummy = subchannels[secret];

• But this kernel code is protected by a branch. Can we make the kernel speculatively execute "xmit"?

```
if (kernel_address is public_region) {
    uint8_t index = *kernel_address;
    uint8_t dummy = subchannels[index];
}
```

Spectre variant 1 [Kocher et al. 2018]


• Consider the following kernel code, e.g., in a system call

```
if (x < array1_size)
  y = array2[array1[x] * 4096];</pre>
```

- 1. Precondition: Flush all the elements in array2 from cache
- 2. Train: Attacker invokes this kernel code with small values of x to train the branch predictor to be taken
- 3. Transmit: Attacker invokes this code with an <u>out-of-bounds</u> x, so that <u>array1[x]</u> points to a desired kernel address. Core mispredicts branch, <u>speculatively</u> fetches address <u>array2[array1[x] * 4096]</u> into the cache.
- 4. Receive: Attacker probes cache to infer which line of array2 was fetched, learns data at kernel address


Spectre variant 2 [Kocher et al. 2018]

- Can also exploit indirect branch predictor:
 - Most BTBs store partial tags for source addresses



- 1. Train: trigger victim_branch -> xmit many times
- 2. Transmit: 'victim_branch' and 'training_branch' alias in BTB, so we can speculatively trigger victim_branch -> xmit
- 3. Receive: similar to Spectre v1

Types of Transmitters



- Types of transmitter:
 - 1. Pre-existing so victim itself leaks secret, (e.g., RSA keys)
 - 2. Programmed and invoked by attacker (e.g., Meltdown)
 - 3. Synthesized from existing victim code and invoked by attacker (e.g., Spectre v2)

Spectre variants and mitigations

- Spectre relies on speculative execution, not late exception handling → Much harder to fix than Meltdown
- Several other Spectre variants reported
 - Leveraging the speculative store buffer, return address stack, leaking privileged registers, etc.
- Can attack any type of VM, including OSs, VMMs, JavaScript engines in browsers, and the OS network stack (NetSpectre)
- Short-term mitigations:
 - Microcode updates (disable sharing of speculative state when possible)
 - OS and compiler patches to selectively avoid speculation
- Long-term mitigations:
 - Disabling speculation?
 - Closing side channels?

Summary

- ISA is a timing-independent interface, and
 - Specify what should happen, not when
- ISA only specifies architectural updates
 - Micro-architectural changes are left unspecified
- Implementation details (e.g., speculative execution) and timing behaviors (e.g., microarchitectural state, power, etc.) have been exploited to breach security mechanisms.
- ISA, as a software-hardware contract, is insufficient for reasoning about microarchitectural security

Coming Spring 2024: Secure Hardware Design 6.5950/1

Learn to attack processors...

Side channel attacks

Spectre, Meltdown, Foreshadow

Row-hammer attacks

Intel SGX

ARM TrustZone

Hardware mitigations for ROP/ JOP

And how to defend them!

Secure Hardware Design @ MIT

Making Computer Architecture Fun!



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Thank you!