Non-transient Side Channels

Mengjia Yan Fall 2020







Lab Assignment

- Handout on course website
- Each (regular) student will receive an email
 - Solo or 2-person group
 - Individual GitHub repo
 - Info about accessing a server machine
- Listeners can send us an email if you want to try the lab
- Advice:
 - Start early. The first step is not to implement the attack, but to reverse engineer the machine.


Recap: Prime+Probe



Recap: Prime+Probe




Recap: Prime+Probe



Receive "1" = 8 accesses \rightarrow 1 miss

Analogy: Bucket/Ball

How many cache lines in total in the system? How to find the bucket used by the sender?




Practical Cache Side Channels






Cache Mapping – Directly Mapped Cache

- Can think cache mapping as a hash table with limited size
- Linear cache set mapping using modular arithmetic




Set Index = (Addr / Block Size) % Number of Sets



Cache Mapping – Directly Mapped Cache

- Can think cache mapping as a hash table with limited size
- Linear cache set mapping using modular arithmetic Assuming byte-addressable



Question: Given an 1MB L2 with 1024 sets, how many bits are used for set index?

6.888 L5-Non-transient Side Channels


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7

Cache Mapping – Set Associative Cache

- Can think cache mapping as a hash table with limited size
- Linear cache set mapping using modular arithmetic






Question: How to decide which way to use?


Answer: Cache replacement policy.

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Address Translation (4KB page)



Find Eviction Set Using Virtual Addresses



Huge Pages

- Huge page size: 2MB or 1GB
 - Number of bits for page offset?

	48	12	11	0
Virtual Address : 4KB page	Virtual page number		Page offset (12 bits)	

Virtual Address :	48 21	20		0
2MB page	Virtual page number	Page offset (21 bits)		
Cache mapping: (256 sets)	Тад		Set Index (8 bits)	Line offset (6 bits)

Multi-level Caches

- Motivation:
 - A memory cannot be large and fast. Add level of cache to reduce miss penalty


A typical configuration of Intel Ivy Bridge. Configurations are different with processor types.


core	core	
I-L1 D-L1	I-L1 D-L1	•••
L2	L2	
	LLC	

	L1-I/D cache	L2 cache	L3 cache (LLC)	DRAM
Size	32KB	256KB	1MB/core	16GB
Associativity (# ways)	4 or 8	8	16	N/A
Latency (cycles)	1-5	12	~40	~150

Multi-level Caches


- Motivation:
 - A memory cannot be large and fast. Add level of cache to reduce miss penalty
- LLC is generally divided into multiple slices
 - Conflict happens if addresses map to the same slice and the same set






core

core




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
Eviction Set Construction Algorithm



Eviction Set Construction Algorithm



Eviction Set Construction Algorithm




Problems Due to Replacement Policy

- Self-eviction due to replacement policy
 - An LRU (least recently used) example




• Access addresses in reverse order




Measure Latency of Multiple Accesses


• HW Prefetcher + Out-of-order execution





Out-of-Order Processor






Serialize Data Accesses


• A special instruction "mfence"

https://www.felixcloutier.com/x86/mfence

• Add data dependency by creating a linked list



• Double linked list to access addresses in reverse order



Handle Noise

• A real-world example: Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation

What you generally see in papers:

for i = n-1 to 0 do $r = sqr(r) \mod n$ if $e_i == 1$ then $r = mul(r, b) \mod n$ end end


The Multiply Function

471 mpi_limb_t

```
472 mpihelp_mul( mpi_ptr_t prodp, mpi_ptr_t up, mpi_size_t usize,
                     mpi_ptr_t vp, mpi_size_t vsize)
473
474 {
       mpi_ptr_t prod_endp = prodp + usize + vsize - 1;
475
       mpi_limb_t cy;
476
477
       struct karatsuba_ctx ctx;
478
       if( vsize < KARATSUBA_THRESHOLD ) {</pre>
479
480
       mpi_size_t i;
       mpi_limb_t v_limb;
481
482
483
       if( !vsize )
484
           return 0;
485
486
       /* Multiply by the first limb in V separately, as the result can be
487
         * stored (not added) to PROD. We also avoid a loop for zeroing. */
       v_limb = vp[0];
488
489
       if( v_limb <= 1 ) {
           if(v_limb == 1)
490
491
           MPN_COPY( prodp, up, usize );
492
           else
493
           MPN_ZERO( prodp, usize );
           cy = ∅;
494
495
        }
496
       else
497
           cy = mpihelp_mul_1( prodp, up, usize, v_limb );
498
       prodp[usize] = cy;
499
500
       prodp++;
```

```
501
502
        /* For each iteration in the outer loop, multiply one limb from
503
         * U with one limb from V, and add it to PROD. */
504
       for( i = 1; i < vsize; i++ ) {</pre>
            v_limb = vp[i];
505
            if( v_limb <= 1 ) 🚦
506
            CY = 0;
507
508
            if( v_{limb} == 1 )
509
               cy = mpihelp_add_n(prodp, prodp, up, usize);
            }
510
511
            else
512
            cy = mpihelp_addmul_1(prodp, up, usize, v_limb);
513
514
            prodp[usize] = cy;
515
            prodp++;
516
       }
517
518
        return cy;
519
        3
520
521
        memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
522
        mpihelp_mul_karatsuba_case( prodp, up, usize, vp, vsize, &ctx );
523
        mpihelp_release_karatsuba_ctx( &ctx );
524
        return *prod_endp;
525 }
```

Raw Trace



Access latencies measured in the probe operation in Prime+Probe. A sequence of "01010111011001" can be deduced as part of the exponent.

There may exist other problems


- Tips for lab assignment
 - Build the attack step-by-step
 - Recommend to read "Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical"
 - Ask questions via Piazza

Defenses






Micro-architecture Side Channels




Kiriansky et al. DAWG: a defense against cache timing attacks in speculative execution processors. MICRO'18

Micro-architecture Side Channels




Kiriansky et al. DAWG: a defense against cache timing attacks in speculative execution processors. MICRO'18

Defense Design Considerations



The Problem: The ISA Abstraction

- Interface between HW and SW: ISA
 - Advantage: HW optimizations without affecting usability/portability



DEC — **Decrement** by 1

Opcode	Instruction	Op/En	64-Bit Mode	Compat/Leg Mode	Description
FE /1	DEC r/m8	Μ	Valid	Valid	Decrement $r/m8$ by 1.
REX + FE /1	DEC $r/m8^*$	Μ	Valid	N.E.	Decrement $r/m8$ by 1.
FF /1	DEC r/m16	М	Valid	Valid	Decrement $r/m16$ by 1.
FF /1	DEC r/m32	Μ	Valid	Valid	Decrement $r/m32$ by 1.
REX.W + FF /1	DEC r/m64	Μ	Valid	N.E.	Decrement <i>r/m64</i> by 1.
48+rw	DEC r16	0	N.E.	Valid	Decrement <i>r16</i> by 1.
48+rd	DEC <i>r32</i>	0	N.E.	Valid	Decrement $r32$ by 1.

 $* \ In 64-bit mode, r/m 8 cannot be encoded to access the following by teregisters if a REX prefix is used: AH, BH, CH, DH.$

Instruction Operand Encoding J

Op/En	Operand 1	Operand 2	Operand 3	Operand 4
Μ	ModRM:r/m (r, w)	NA	NA	NA
0	opcode + rd (r, w)	NA	NA	NA

Description

Subtracts 1 from the destination operand, while preserving the state of the CF flag. The destination operand can be a register or a memory location. This instruction allows a loop counter to be updated without disturbing the CF flag. (To perform a decrement operation that updates the CF flag, use a SUB instruction with an immediate operand of 1.)

This instruction can be used with a LOCK prefix to allow the instruction to be executed atomically.

In 64-bit mode, DEC r16 and DEC r32 are not encodable (because opcodes 48H through 4FH are REX prefixes). Otherwise, the instruction's 64-bit mode default operation size is 32 bits. Use of the REX.R prefix permits access to additional registers (R8-R15). Use of the REX.W prefix promotes operation to 64 bits.

See the summary chart at the beginning of this section for encoding data and limits.


Operation J

From https://www.felixcloutier.com/x86/index.html

DEST \leftarrow DEST -1;

The Problem: The ISA Abstraction

- Interface between HW and SW: ISA
- ISA specifies functionality, not performance/timing
 - Compare Intel Ivy Bridge and Cascade Processor



Example:

DEC [addr]

Data Oblivious/"Constant time" Programming

Write program w/o data-dependent behavior


Original:

Data Oblivious:

if (**secret**) a = *(addr1); else a = *(addr2);


secret = confidential
addr1 = public
addr2 = public

a ← load (addr1); b ← load (addr2); cmov a = (secret) ? a : b;




Programming in Circuit Abstraction

- Program = DAG ("circuit")
- Operations = nodes ("gates")
- Data transfers = edges ("wires")
- Topology must be confidential data-independent
- Each gate's execution must hide its inputs
- Each wire must hide the value it carries



What assumptions underpin the model?




- **Rule 1:** instruction/gate execution = confidential data-independent
- Rule 2: data transfer/wire
- **Rule 3:** circuit/program topology = fixed
- = confidential data-independent

Today's machines can violate these assumptions

Violations due to:

Data-dependent instruction optimizations

(e.g., zero-skip, early exit, microcode, silent stores, ...)




- **Rule 1:** instruction/gate execution = confidential data-independent
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Violations due to:

Data at rest optimizations

(e.g., compression in register file/uop fusion, cache, page tables, ...)




• **Rule 1:** instruction/gate execution = confidential data-independent

• Rule 2: data transfer/wire

= confidential data-independent

Rule 3: circuit/program topology = fixed


Today's machines can violate these assumptions



- Rule 2: data transfer/wire = confidential data-independent
- **Rule 3:** circuit/program topology = fixed

HW Resource Partition

- Security v.s. Quality of Service (QoS)
 - Intel Cache Allocation Technology (CAT)
- Temporal Partition v.s. Spatial Partition
- Challenges nowadays:
 - Security domain determination is tricky nowadays
 - Scalability: what is #domains > #partitions
 - How to partition inside cores?
 - Why not execute applications on a single node?



Randomization/Fuzzing

Introduce noise to time measurement/Make time measurement coarse-grained

....

• Pros and cons?

- + Simple and no performance overhead
- + Effective towards a group of popular attacks
- Not effective to attacks that do not measure time
- Not effective to victims that cause big timing difference
- Affect usability if benign application needs to use a fine-grained timer
- Randomize cache mapping functions
 - Pros and cons?

- + Generally low performance overhead (still allow cache to be shared)- Difficult to reason about security
- +/- Can reduce attack bandwidth, but unlikely to eliminate attacks

Next Lecture: Transient Side Channels



